

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 02759 01 OF 02 161744Z

51

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02 ACDA-05

NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

SS-15 NSC-05 ERDA-05 /066 W
----- 059354

R 161510Z MAY 75
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1867
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 2759

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: DPC, MPOL, NATO
SUBJECT: MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE; WARNING OF WAR; MAY 15 DPC MEETING

REF: A. USNATO 2634 B. USNATO 2480
C. USNATO 2500
D. STATE 111696

SUMMARY. DURING MAY 15 DPC DISCUSSION OF WARNING OF WAR SECTION OF MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE, DPC CONSIDERED US SUBSTITUTE PARAS 22-23 (REF A). ONLY NETHERLANDS WOULD COMPLETELY ACCEPT US DRAFT. FRG AND TURKEY WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT US DRAFT PROVIDED IT WAS AMENDED TO REFLECT WP CAPABILITY TO STAGE SURPRISE ATTACK. UK PROPOSED COMPROMISE SURPRISE ATTACK LANGUAGE ACCEPTABLE TO FRG, BUT NO TO TURKEY OR US. OTHER ALLIES DID NOT COMMENT. DPC INSERTED BOTH PRESENT DRAFT AND US SUBSTITUTE PARAS 22-23 IN PRACKETS FOR MINISTERIAL CONSIDERATION. END SUMMARY.

1. DURING MAY 15 DPC DISCUSSION OF WARNING OF WAR SECTION OF MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE, SYG LUNS CALLED COMMITTEE'S ATTENTION TO PREVIOUS DPD DISCUSSION OF ISSUE (REFS B AND C) AND US LETTER OF SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02759 01 OF 02 161744Z

MAY 12 (REF A) WHICH HAD REOPENED PARAS 22-23. HE CALLED ON ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET HILL-NORTON FOR COMMENTS ON MILITARY ASPECTS OF BOTH PRESENT AND US-PROPOSED DRAFT PARAGRAPHS.

2. ADMIRAL HILL-NORTON (CHAIRMAN, MC) STATED THAT ISSUE HAD BEEN DEBATED AROUND THE TABLE AND IN CORRIDORS FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME. HE NOTED THAT AT PREVIOUS DPC MEETING HE HAD TAKEN ISSUE WITH US POSITION, SINCE IN HIS VIEW PRESENT PARA 22 IS NOT LIABLE TO MISINTERPRETATION. HE FELT "BOUND TO SAY, IN ALL HONESTY, I DO NOT LIKE THE US PARAGRAPHS BECAUSE IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IN A GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, UNLESS YOU ARE RATHER MORE PRECISE ON WARNING TIME, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY THE THINGS COMING LATER, PARTICULARLY CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCES AND PRIORITIES." HE SATED THAT ONE COULD TAKE US TEXT TO THE ILLOGICAL CONCLUSION OF AN "OPEN-ENDED VIEW OF WARNING TIME" AND JUSTIFY REDUCTION IN COMBAT-READY FORCES. HE DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS "LONGING TO AGREE" , BUT STATED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE TRUE TO DPC IF HE DID NOT POINT OUT DANGER IN SUCH AN OPEN-ENDED VIEW OF WARNING TIME AS US HAD PROPOSED.

3. AMBASSADOR BRUCE STATED THAT DRAFT CONTAINED IN DPC/D(75)4 HAD MADE AN ATTEMPT TO DESCRIBE VARIOUS WARNING POSSIBILITIES BY USING SELECTED EXAMPLES FROM MC-161, AND THAT US BELIEVES THAT BY APPROVING SUCH ILLUSTRATIONS IN MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE OUR DEFENSE MINISTERS MIGHT BE SEEN AS OVEREMPHASIZING THEM AND ESTABLISHING A BASIS FOR PLANNING. HE NOTED THAT, IN FACT, A RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES EXISTS. CONCERNING THE LONGER WARNING CASES OF THIS RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES, HE SAID THAT US HAD ADDED LANGUAGE DRAWN FROM MC-161 WHICH SPECIFIES THAT "SOME WEEKS" MIGHT BE REQUIRED FOR THE EXTENSION REDEPLOYMENT OF GROUND AND NAVAL FORCES WHICH WOULD NECESSARILY PRECEDE A FULL-STRENGTH ATTACK. HE NOTED THAT THIS ADDITION RESTORES BALANCE TO THE DOCUMENT. FINALLY, HE SAID THAT BY REMOVING SPECIFIC EXAMPLES THE US HAD INCREASED LEVEL OF GENERALITY OF PAPER. HE FELT THIS WAS NECESSARY, SINCE SPECIFICS MIGHT BE MISINTERPRETED, BUT EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT INCREASED LEVEL OF GENERALITY MADE THE US DRAFT MORE USEFUL THAN THE PRESENT DRAFT IN THAT IT ACCOUNTED FOR A RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES WHICH MUST BE TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT IN NATO PLANNING.

4. ERALP (TURKEY) NOTED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES HAD CAREFULLY STUDIED THE US LETTER OF MAY 12 AND AGREED WITH ITS CONTENT. HE
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02759 01 OF 02 161744Z

NOTED PARTICULARLY US POINT ON INTER-RELATION BETWEEN LENGTH OF WP PREPARATION AND STRENGTH OF ATTACK, AND REFERENCE TO MC-161/75. HE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT WARNING TIME CAN START WITH EITHER THE DETECTION OF PREPARATIONS OR WITH SURPRISE ATTACK, AS DETERMINED BY THE ENEMY, AND ASKED WHY US HAD NOT INCLUDED PROVISION FOR SURPRISE ATTACK, CLEARLY STIPULATED IN MC-161, IN ITS DRAFT. HE SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO READY WP FORCES WHICH ARE IN PLACE. AND OFFERED TO ACCEPT EITHER US LANGUAGE AMENDED TO RECOGNIZE CAPABILITY FOR SURPRISE ATTACK OR THE PRESENT DRAFT.

5. KRAPF (FRG) STATED THAT HE WAS "NOT HAPPY WITH THE NEW PROPOSAL." HE FELT THEY PRESENTED A ONE-SIDED PICTURE, OVEREMPHASIZING LONG

WARNING AND NOT RECOGNIZING POSSIBILITY OF SURPRISE ATTACK. HE PROPOSED TWO CHANGES TO PARA 23 TO MAKE THE US DRAFT ACCEPTABLE: 1) FOLLOWING "ACCOMPLISH", ADD MC-161 SENTENCE: "HOWEVER, IT MUST BE CONSIDERED THAT THE BUILD-UP FOR STARTING MAJOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN A RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME"; 2) ADD SENTENCE TO END OF PARAGRAPH: "HOWEVER, THE WARSAW PACT ALSO HAS THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH A SURPRISE ATTACK WITH NUCLEAR

MISSILES, OR WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCES, ON LAND OR SEA WITH MINIMAL PREPARATIONS IF THEIR OBJECTIVES ARE LIMITED." KRAPF NOTED THAT WP USE OF LATTER CAPABILITY IS "UNLIKELY, BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE". LUNS REMARKED THAT US VIEW IS THAT SUCH AN ATTACK IS "HIGHLY, HIGHLY UNLIKELY."

6. HARTOGH (NETHERLANDS) RECALLED PREVIOUS DPC DISCUSSION OF WARNING TIME AND STATED NETHERLANDS PREFERENCE FOR A SIMPLE REFERENCE TO MC-161, ALTHOUGH HE RECOGNIZED THAT THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS TO DOCUMENT OF ONE MEMBER. HE FOUND US TEXT ACCEPTABLE, BUT WAS "MORE IN AGREEMENT" WITH THE PRESENT DRAFT.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 02759 02 OF 02 161805Z

51
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02 ACDA-05

NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

SS-15 NSC-05 ERDA-05 /066 W
----- 059831

R 161510Z MAY 75
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1868
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 2759

7. REFERRING TO FRG AMENDMENTS, AMBASSADOR BRUCE STATED US COULD ACCEPT THE FIRST, BUT THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE SECOND WOULD LEAD TO LACK OF BALANCE IN THE DRAFT. HE NOTED LUNS' OBSERVATION ON THE US VIEW THAT A SURPRISE ATTACK IS UNLIKELY, BUT STATED HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS TO AGREE TO LANGUAGE PROPOSED BY THE FRG. PECK (UK) SUMMED UP THE DIFFERENCE IN WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS "SIMPLE", CRUDE TERMS". ONE'S VIEW ON THIS ISSUE DEPENDS ON HOW FAR HE IS FROM THE RUSSIANS. TURKEY AND THE FRG WERE NATURALLY CONCERNED. HE SUGGESTED COMPROMISE LANGUAGE ALONG THE LINES THAT A SURPRISE

ATTACK COULD BE POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY IN CERTAIN AREAS, AND EXPRESSED A WILLINGNESS TO LEAVE EXACT WORDING TO THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF. ERALP (TURKEY) STATED THAT SURPRISE IS A PARTICULAR CASE AMONG OTHER CASES, AND NOTED SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF SOUTHERN REGION WHICH HE FELT RESULTED IN INCREASED LIKELIHOOD OF THIS CASE. SYG LUNS AGREED WITH PECK'S PROPOSAL. NOTING THAT THE US HAD ACCEPTED MC-161, WHEREIN SURPRISE ATTACK CASE IS CLEARLY STATED, HE ASKED AMBASSADOR BRUCE IF HE COULD ACCEPT UK COMPROMISE PROPOSAL. AMBASSADOR BRUCE NOTED THAT HE COULD NOT GO THAT FAR; HE NOTED THAT HE HAD NO LEEWAY IN THE MATTER. KRAPF (FRG) STRONGLY URGED THAT US CONSIDER UK COMPROMISE. HE NOTED THAT ISSUE OF SURPRISE ATTACK IS GEOGRAPHICAL, BUT POLITICAL TOO, AND CITED
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02759 02 OF 02 161805Z

MC-161 STATEMENT THAT LIKELIHOOD OF SURPRISE ATTACK INCREASES IF THE SOVIETS SHOULD PERCEIVE THAT NATO COHESION AND FORCE POSTURE ARE WEAKENING.

8. AMBASSADOR BRUCE SUGGESTED THAT DPC BRACKET PRESENT TEXT AND US TEXT FOR PARAS 22-23. SYG LUNS AGREED. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) SUGGESTED ALSO BRACKETING BRITISH IDEA, NOTING THAT ALL MINISTERS WOULD LIKE IT. ADMIRAL HILL-NORTON NOTED THAT BRITISH LANGUAGE SHOULD BE AMENDED FOR COMPLETE CONFORMITY WITH MC-161. HE ALSO SUGGESTED TWO AMENDMENTS TO THE US ALTERNATIVE PARAGRAPHS: 1) PARAGRAPH 22, CHANGE "SUMMARIZES" TO "DESCRIBES"; 2) PARAGRAPH 23, FIRST SENTENCE SHOULD NOTE LIKELIHOOD OF PRECEDING PERIOD OF POLITICAL TENSION "IN ALL PLAUSIBLE CIRCUMSTANCES". SYG STATED THAT IS WOULD BEAR THESE TWO CHANGES IN MIND.

9. FOLLOWING MEETING, IS CONTACTED MISSION OFFICER TO CLARIFY US DESIRES AS TO EXACT CONTENT OF US-BRACKETED TEXT. DRC WILL MEET MAY 16 TO DISCUSS EXACT BRACKETED VERSIONS FOR MINISTERIAL CONSIDERATION.

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 18 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 MAY 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NATO002759
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750599/abbrzkaz.tel
Line Count: 200
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A. USNATO 2634 B. USNATO 2480 C. USNATO 2500 D. STATE 111696
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 01 MAY 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <01 MAY 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <25 SEP 2003 by CunninFX>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE; WARNING OF WAR; MAY 15 DPC MEETING
TAGS: DPC, MPOL, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT
Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006